In this paper, we examine the role of recessions on the relative forecasting performance of the Fed and the private sector. Romer and Romer (2000) show that the Fed's forecasts of in ‡ation and output were superior to that of the private sector for the pre-1991 period. D'Agostino and Whelan (2007) …ndings suggest that the information superiority of the Fed deteriorated after 1991. Our results show that the information superiority of the Fed in forecasting real activity arose from its forecasting dominance during recessions. If recessions are excluded from pre-1991 period, the informational advantage of the Fed disappears, and in some cases private sector forecasts perform better. We do not …nd any systematic e¤ect of recessions on in ‡ation forecasts.
Introduction
The Greenbook forecasts prepared by the Federal Reserve Sta¤ play a major role in the formulation of monetary policy in the U.S.. These forecasts are presented to the monetary policy makers before each Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. The private sector also spends substantial amount of resources to generate their own forecasts for major macroeconomic variables, for instance, output, in ‡ation, and unemployment. These forecasts play a major role in shaping the expectation of the public and the market about the future macroeconomic environment. Since Greenbook forecasts are released with a lag of …ve years, they are not available in public domain in real-time.
There has been a considerable interest in the macroeconomic literature about the relative superiority of the Greenbook forecasts over the private sector forecasts (Romer and 1 . Using data till 1991, Romer and Romer (2000) show that the Greenbook forecasts of in ‡ation and real GDP are statistically unbiased and dominate private sector forecasts. Their …ndings suggest that the Federal Reserve has considerable information about in ‡ation beyond what is known to the private sector. The U.S. macroeconomic volatility has witnessed a "Great Moderation" in the last twenty years (Kim and Nelson (1999) In this paper, we examine the role of recessions and the turning points in existence of the information asymmetry between the Fed and the private sector in the pre-1991 sample period.
We concentrate on the role of recessions because the degree of underperformance of forecasts increase signi…cantly at the business cycle turning points. This is especially important for real variables, since the volatility of these variables is usually very high at business cycle turning points, which makes the job of forecasting really di¢ cult. The previous research in the literature has focused on real GDP and in ‡ation forecasts. In addition to real GDP growth, we also include industrial production, housing starts, and unemployment as 1 Romer and Romer use three measures of private sector forecasts: Blue Chip, DRI, and Survey of Professional Forecasters. D'Agostino and Whelan (2007) use only Survey of Professional Forecasters'forecasts as a proxy for the private sector forecasts. Their choice is mainly based on the availability of the data. We follow D'Agostino and Whelan (2007) and use SPF forecasts as a measure of private sector forecasts. di¤erent measures of real activity. We also compare the relative forecasting performance of the new measures of real activity used in this paper for both sample periods. Our …ndings for industrial production, housing starts, and unemployment reinforce D'Agostino and Whelan's …ndings that the information superiority of the Fed has disappeared in the 1990s. The inclusion of these measures of real activity can provide useful insights in our study especially since industrial production and housing start are leading indicators of business cycles.
Our results show that the Federal Reserve's superiority in forecasting real activity arises from its better forecasting performance during recessions and at business cycle turning points.
If recessionary periods are excluded, then asymmetric information between the Fed and the private sector forecasts disappears for most of the forecast horizons for di¤erent measures of real activity. This result arises from the nature of the forecasts during the recessions, as the error committed by the private forecasters during recessions is higher on average.
For current quarter forecasts the results are slightly mixed. The presence of a single mild recession between 1992-2001 in our sample may have been one of the reasons behind the convergence in the relative forecasting performance of the real activity. We do not …nd any signi…cant e¤ect of recessions on forecasting performance of in ‡ation. The exclusion of recessionary periods and turning points does not improve the forecasting performance of in ‡ation of the private sector relative to the Federal Reserve. Therefore, the disappearance in information asymmetry in case of in ‡ation at longer horizons has occurred mainly because of a break in the in ‡ation dynamics.
The plan of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in this paper; section 3 tests the rationality of di¤erent forecasts; section 4 compares the accuracy of di¤erent forecasts; section 5 tests for information asymmetry, section 6 examines the impact of accelerations in variables on forecast errors, and section 7 concludes.
Data Description
We use four measures of real activity: real output, index of industrial production, unemployment rate, and housing starts. These measures of real activity are selected on the basis of data availability as forecasts for these variables are available since 1968 for both the Federal For early part of the sample when twelve Greenbook forecasts are available, we also choose the quarterly forecasts that were made in the second month of the quarter. The Greenbook forecasts are made available to the public with a …ve-year delay, and hence our sample ends in the last quarter of 2001.
Since all these measures of real activity and GDP de ‡ator are subject to heavy revisions, data vintage selection for true realized value becomes an issue. We follow Romer and Romer (2000) in using the data released at the end of the third month following the end of the quarter that is being measured 3 .
Test of Rationality
Before comparing the accuracy of forecasts, it would be interesting to investigate the rationality of the Greenbook forecasts and the private sector forecasts. 
where y t+h denotes the actual value of the variable of interest (GDP growth, IIP, in ‡ation etc.) at time t+h, h is the forecast horizon. For example, if h=1, y t+1 is the actual realization of the variable of interest, and b y t+1;t represents the forecast of y t+1 at time t. If forecasts are rational, then the null hypothesis of = 0; and = 1 would not be rejected. Table 2 and 3 report rationality test results for the Greenbook and the SPF forecasts for the full sample. P-value in tables 1 and 2 is the estimated p-values for testing null hypotheses.
The results indicate that for most of the variables the null of rationality is not rejected at all horizons. As expected, the explanatory power of di¤erent forecasts decreases as the forecast horizon increases. The degree of reduction in forecasting power as forecast horizon increases is striking for the GDP growth and the industrial production. Our results indicate that the current quarter Greenbook and SPF forecast of index of industrial production can explain around 70 percent of the movement in the actual variable, which gets reduced to less than 3 percent for 4-quarter ahead SPF forecasts and 12 percent for Greenbook forecasts.
Our results show that the explanatory power of Greenbook forecast is better than the SPF forecasts in most of the cases, and particularly for in ‡ation. We also …nd that the degree of superiority of Greenbook's forecast of industrial production and housing start over SPF gets magni…ed at longer horizons.
Forecast Comparison

Informal Evidence
Asymmetric information between the Fed and the private forecasters about the future economic conditions is based on the assumption that the forecasting performance is similar on average across di¤erent points of business cycles. However, there is compelling anecdotal evidence which shows that macroeconomic forecasts fail to predict turning points and performance is relatively poor during the recessionary periods. Figures 1-4 show rolling 1-year Mean Squared Errors (MSEs) for GDP growth, IIP, unemployment rate, housing starts, and in ‡ation for 2-,3-, and 4-quarter ahead forecasts. The shaded region represents NBER recessions including a quarter before the peak and a quarter after the trough. A pattern is evident in these MSEs especially at 2-,3-and 4-horizon forecasts. We …nd that the MSEs for these real activity measures peak during business cycle turning points and during recessions. It is also clear that the private sector's forecast errors are consistently higher than the Greenbook forecast errors for 2-, 3-and 4-quarter forecast horizons during recessions. The results are relatively mixed for short-horizon forecasts (0-and 1-quarter ahead forecasts). 4 This ambiguity in short-horizon forecasts is not very surprising since timing of the forecasts plays a very big role in short-horizon forecasts. Since there is no exact overlap in the timing of these two forecasts ( i.e. forecasts are not released at the same date) we cannot draw certain conclusions from the comparison of the short-horizon forecasts. We can draw more certain conclusions on the basis of long-horizon forecasts as the non-overlap of forecast release dates should not cause a problem for the longer horizon forecast comparisons.
Formal Evidence
To further investigate the issue of information asymmetry, we look at the MSEs of di¤erent variables. we also exclude one quarter prior to the peak and one quarter after the trough. Similarly columns 3 and 4 show the ratio of MSEs during the pre-1991 period with and without recession. We look at the relative forecasting performance of real GDP growth …rst. As can be seen from the table, for both the sample periods ( columns 1 and 3), Greenbook forecasts perform better on average than the SPF forecasts except for the 1-quarter ahead forecasts.
If periods of recession are excluded from both samples, then the ratio increases, and in fact becomes higher than one in all the cases except for the 2-quarter ahead forecasts. This implies that if the recessionary periods are excluded from the sample, then informational advantage of the Fed disappears in case of the real GDP forecasts. In fact, for most of the forecast horizons private forecasts perform better than on average when periods of recession 4 The graphs for 0-, and 1-quarter ahead MSEs are not shown here.
are excluded from the sample.
The forecast errors of industrial production show similar pattern. For 2-, 3-, and 4-quarter ahead MSE-ratio changes from less than one to higher than one in 5 out of 6 cases implying that the information asymmetry gets reversed when the sample period does not include recessions. We do not …nd the same pattern for current and 1-quarter ahead forecasts.
Greenbook forecasts are better on average in all cases even if we exclude the recessions. As pointed out earlier, direct comparison of short-horizon forecasts is relatively di¢ cult because of the non-overlap of the forecast release dates.
Unemployment rate is the third measure of real activity in our study. For current and 1-quarter ahead forecasts private forecasts are better on average for all sample periods and for short-horizon forecasts, superior performance of private forecasts decreased after excluding the recessionary period. For 2-, 3-, and 4-quarter forecasts, we again …nd that the dominance of the Greenbook forecasts disappears after the exclusion of the recessionary periods as MSEratio increases from less than one to greater than one.
We …nd similar trends for housing starts. Therefore the graphical pattern shown in …gures 1-4 is reinforced by looking at the numerical values of the ratio of the forecast errors for di¤erent sample periods. Our results indicate that the Fed's information superiority is based on its ability to provide better forecasts during recessions and at business cycle turning points. Therefore less frequent occurrence of recessions may have caused the disappearance of the Fed's dominance in forecasting performance of the real activity after 1991.
We also investigate the role of turning points and recessions in the Fed' superior forecasting performance of in ‡ation. We …nd that the inclusion or the exclusion of recessions and turning points from the sample doesn't a¤ect the superiority of Greenbook forecasts of in ‡ation. In fact, Greenbook forecasts perform even better after exclusion of recessionary periods and turning points. To further investigate the relative forecasting performance, we look at rolling 1-year MSE of 0-4 quarter horizon forecasts of in ‡ation. Figure 5 shows that the superior forecasting performance of the Fed's in ‡ation forecast is arising from the behavior of private forecasts during 1980-1987 period. There were persistent and signi…cantly higher errors committed by the private forecasters in forecasting in ‡ation during that time period. This is consistent with the …nding in the literature that in ‡ationary expectations of private sector adjusted slowly after the "Great In ‡ation" of the 1970s (Stock and Watson (2000)).
Test of Information Asymmetry
To test the hypothesis whether individuals who know the SPF forecasts could make better forecasts if they also knew the Fed sta¤'s forecasts, Romer and Romer (2000) used the following speci…cation:
where y t+h denotes the actual value of the variable of interest (GDP, IIP, in ‡ation etc.), h is the forecast horizon, and b y The above baseline model is estimated with forecasts of each quarter separately. One concern that is associated with these quarterly regressions is that the results may represent quarter-to-quarter noise. To take care of this problem, we follow Romer and Romer and also estimate the following model
where y t+h is average of variable y up to horizon h, and b y The empirical evidence presented above for real activity indicates that not only the Fed's informational superiority over the private sector has disappeared, its overall predictive power has also declined signi…cantly. This decline in predictability in the post-1992 period is consistent across di¤erent forecast horizons and di¤erent variables. This is also true for private sector forecasts. Therefore it seems that the disappearance of the information asymmetry is due to a reduction in the predictive power of di¤erent forecasts. However, it should also be noted that the overall forecast error has declined signi…cantly in the second period. The reduction in predictive power of di¤erent forecast is the result of an increase in stability of di¤erent macroeconomic variables. To illustrate this point, consider an extreme example. If economy becomes perfectly stable, there would not be any variability in the main macroeconomic indicators. By construction, a constant is uncorrelated with any predictor. Therefore the overall stability or the absence of recessions in the post-1992 period might have caused the disappearance of the information asymmetry between the Fed and the private sector.
The comparison of forecast errors in our earlier analysis showed that Fed's forecasting dominance did arise mainly from its superiority in forecasting performance at business cycles turning points and recessions. This result is consistent for the full sample period as well as for the 1968-1991 period. In this section, we examine the role of recessions and turning points in information asymmetry between the Greenbook forecasts and the private forecasts using equation 1. Table 3 shows the results for the case when recessions are excluded from the full sample period and the pre-1991 sample period. If recessions don't a¤ect the information contained in these two forecasts then the results obtained in table 5 will hold. Our results show that for 2-,3-,and 4-quarter horizon forecasts for real activity, the informational advantage of the Fed arises due to its performance during recessions. Once recessionary periods are excluded, the informational advantage of the Fed for both sample periods disappears.
The point estimate of GDP growth, IIP, unemployment rate, and housing starts are signi…cant and close to one for 2-,3-, and 4-quarter ahead Greenbook forecasts for both the sample periods. Once recessionary periods are excluded from the regression, the point estimate of Greenbook forecasts decreases signi…cantly, and in some cases become negative.
All the coe¢ cients on Greenbook forecasts become insigni…cant once recessionary periods are excluded. For 3-quarter ahead housing starts forecasts, the informational advantage of the The results are slightly mixed for short-horizon forecasts. The …rst interesting result is that the inclusion or the exclusion of recessions does not play a signi…cant role in the determination of information asymmetry. We also …nd that the Fed has informational advantage over private forecasters in predicting industrial production at current and 1-quarter ahead forecasts and current output growth forecast. This informational advantage does not disappear after the exclusion of recessionary periods. Surprisingly, private forecasts dominate Greenbook forecasts for unemployment and housing starts at short-horizons. 
E¤ect of Accelerations and Decelerations on Forecast Errors
The empirical evidence presented in the previous section suggests that the forecasting superiority of the Federal Reserve in the pre-1991 period came mainly from their better forecasting performance at business cycle turning points. Since business cycle turning points are characterized by signi…cant changes in the growth rate of measures of real activity, it would be also be interesting to investigate whether the information superiority of the Fed does hold when the measures of real activity are accelerating or decelerating. To compare the relative forecasting performance of Greenbook and SPF forecasts in the presence of acceleration and deceleration of economic variables, we run the following regression:
where e t is the average forecast error at time t for 0-to 4-quarter ahead forecasts. For example, if the forecasts are made at time t for t, t+1,..t+4 quarters, the dependent variable in the above regression is the average of the forecast errors for di¤erent forecast horizons.
ACCEL t is change in variable over the past 4 quarters. To take care of quarterly noise in the data, we consider the changes over 4-quarters. If y t is the variable of interest, then ACCEL t is de…ned as follows:
where y t can be the level or the growth rate. Table 6 reports the estimation results for equation 4 for both Greenbook and SPF forecasts for the whole sample. The coe¢ cient shows the e¤ect of acceleration and deceleration on average forecast errors. The expected sign of this coe¢ cient is positive implying that when the growth rate is increasing then we expect the forecast error to be positive, and when the acceleration is negative, that is the growth rate is decreasing, we expect the forecast errors to be negative. The results show that for all the variables, the coe¢ cient is lower for Greenbook forecasts. This implies that the e¤ect of acceleration or deceleration in real GDP growth, industrial production, housing starts, unemployment and in ‡ation on their respective average forecast errors is higher for SPF forecasts than the Greenbook forecasts.
This …ts in with our earlier …ndings that the Federal Reserve sta¤ does a superior job of forecasting than the private sector at business cycle turning points.
We examine the role of recessions in the presence of asymmetric information between the 
